University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications - Department of
Philosophy

Philosophy, Department of

10-2015

Book Review: Schroeder, Mark. Explaining the Reasons We Share:
Explanation and Expression in Ethics, vol. 1.
John Brunero

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/philosfacpub
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy, Department of at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications Department of Philosophy by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

238

Ethics

October 2015

thing in our ordinary usage of the term “consent.” And so which account of consent ðan account which of necessity will require an account of agency as wellÞ
should be embraced? Or does Wertheimer’s paper prove, as Brock’s paper suggests for responsibility, that consent should be understood in different ways in
different circumstances? If so, a more complex account of consent and agency
will be required.
The book also demonstrates just how complicated the relationship between
poverty and agency can be. A number of the authors ðnotably JaggarÞ stress the
relationship between gender and poverty. They note that poverty alleviation
measures that leave women disempowered may ultimately prove self-defeating.
Khader, however, stresses the ways that gender and poverty can come apart. For
her, it is precisely because poverty can be alleviated ðto some extent, at leastÞ
without regard to women’s agency that both issues must be consciously addressed
at once. Khader’s essay thus reminds us that while poverty is clearly not a standalone issue, neither is it connected to every other social ill.
The volume Poverty, Agency, and Human Rights is an important contribution
to the fields of global ethics and justice. It tackles difficult moral questions that
arise when considering not only who should realize relatively uncontroversial
claims like those to human rights and freedom from poverty but also how they
should be realized. The second and third parts’ focus on responses to poverty
and the promotion of development reflect, in particular, this orientation toward
practice. For instance, nearly all of the essays in these parts engage with the vast
social-scientific literature on foreign aid’s structural effects.
The volume is, thus, deeply concerned about practical issues in nonideal
theory. We believe that this represents a significant improvement over several of
the earlier contributions to global ethics and justice. The volume’s tripartite
concern with poverty, agency, and human rights illustrates how a narrow focus on
any of these concepts would ignore the interplay between them. This interplay is
where the action is.
Julian Culp
University of Toronto
Nicole Hassoun
SUNY Binghamton
Peter Stone
Trinity College Dublin

Schroeder, Mark. Explaining the Reasons We Share: Explanation and Expression in
Ethics, vol. 1.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 249. $65.00 ðclothÞ.
This volume is a collection of eleven essays by Mark Schroeder, including one
previously unpublished paper, divided into four parts. Schroeder’s substantive
introduction to the volume explains the unifying argumentative thread running
through these essays and will be useful even to those who have read the essays
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separately. The essays themselves are superb. Schroeder’s work is unmatched in its
clarity, incisiveness, originality, creativity, and depth. And this volume will leave the
reader with a new appreciation for various ways in which assumptions about
the structure of normative explanations—particularly about what Schroeder calls
the Standard Model Theory—are important to central debates in metaethics.
When we provide a Standard Model explanation of why someone ought to
perform some action, we show how performing that action is a way or means of
doing something else he ought to do ð28Þ. Suppose Mark promises to attend the
workshop. Here’s a Standard Model explanation of why Mark ought to attend
the workshop: attending the workshop is a way of keeping his promise, and he
ought to keep his promise. On this explanation, there’s some further action
Mark ought to perform ðkeeping his promiseÞ, and attending the workshop is a
way of doing that.
Schroeder’s central target in the essays in part 1 is the Standard Model
Theory, which is the view that “all normative explanations have to work in this
way” ð28Þ. Rejection of the Standard Model Theory makes room for another kind
of normative explanation: a Constitutive Model explanation. A constitutive explanation “explains why something is the case by appeal to claims about what it is
for it to be the case” ð3Þ. And so a Constitutive Model normative explanation will,
for instance, explain why you have a reason to do something by appealing to
what it is to have a reason to do something or explain why you ought to do something by appealing to what it is for it to be the case that you ought to do something ð79, 34Þ.
In “Cudworth and Normative Explanations,” which is justifiably identified as
the “central paper in this volume” ð4Þ, Schroeder shows how Ralph Cudworth’s
argument against theological voluntarism presupposes the Standard Model
Theory. ðMore precisely, it presupposes the Standard-Constitutive Conjecture,
according to which, “all normative explanations must either follow the Standard
Model or the Constitutive Model” along with a skepticism about Constitutive
Model explanations ½37.Þ Theological voluntarists will think that Mark ought to
keep his promise because that’s what God commands. But if we, like Cudworth,
assume the truth of the Standard Model Theory, then the theological voluntarist will seem committed to explaining Mark’s obligation to keep his promise by
seeing his promise keeping as a way of doing something else he ought to be doing,
namely, obeying God. And so the theological voluntarist would seem committed
to thinking that Mark ought to obey God. And this is precisely what puzzles Cudworth. How could the theological voluntarist then coherently explain the obligation to obey God? ðDid God also have to command us to obey him?Þ
The escape route for the theological voluntarist—and for the host of other
views subject to similar objections—is to reject the Standard Model Theory. The
theological voluntarist could hold that God’s commands explain our particular
obligations but deny that this requires him to state that there’s some further,
more general, action ðobeying GodÞ we ought to perform.
However, it’s worth noting here that there’s another way for the theological
voluntarist to escape Cudworth’s challenge which doesn’t require abandoning
the Standard Model Theory: narrowing the scope of what needs explaining.
The Standard Model Theological Voluntarist could hold that the obligation to
obey God is a basic, or fundamental, obligation. It explains other obligations
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but isn’t itself explained by any other. ðAfter all, Standard Model explanations
must run out eventually; you can’t keep explaining obligations in terms of more
general ones.Þ This seems to be an important option for the theological voluntarist or for anyone else who wants to appeal to a fundamental norm or set of
norms. For the purposes of this essay, however, Schroeder follows Cudworth in
thinking that the voluntarist aspires to explain such fundamental norms ð25, 28Þ.
But one might not have those aspirations. ðIt’s worth pointing out one motivation for having such aspirations that Schroeder points to in the introduction to
the volume: if one allows for the existence of one unexplained obligation, that
opens the door for someone to insist on others, leading to pluralism ½4. See also
Schroeder’s related discussion of the Incoherence and Chauvinism objections to
the Humean Theory of Reasons in chap. 3 of Slaves of the Passions ½Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007.Þ
In “Reasons and Agent-Neutrality” and “The Humean Theory of Reasons,”
Schroeder is interested in explaining both the reasons we all share and the
reasons we don’t. He argues that agent-neutral reasons ðe.g., “the fact that Katie
needs help is a reason to help Katie”Þ are best understood as agent-relational
reasons for everyone. In this example, the fact that Katie needs help is a reason
for me to help her, a reason for you to help her, and a reason for everyone else to
help her ð43Þ. Schroeder discusses the broader philosophical significance of this
Quantification Strategy and argues against views committed to denying it.
As for the reasons we don’t share, Schroeder considers, skeptically, whether
the Standard Model Theory could explain why Ronnie, who loves dancing, has a
reason to attend the dance party, while Bradley, who hates dancing, has a reason
to stay away. On a Standard Model explanation, Ronnie and Bradley have these
different reasons because doing each of these things is a way of doing something
else they both have reason to do: doing what they enjoy. But Schroeder notes a
problem: if there is a reason for us to do what we enjoy, we should be able to
specify what that reason is, and it’s not obvious what it is ð56–59, 74–76Þ. So, there
are limitations to Standard Model theorizing: it can’t explain the difference
between Ronnie’s and Bradley’s reasons.
What lessons does Schroeder draw for the Humean theory of reasons? First,
based on general methodological principles, cases like the Ronnie/Bradley case
are the most promising place to look to understand the nature of reasons, and
so provide a “presumptive motivation” for Humeanism ð76Þ. Second, we might
wonder whether there is another explanation of the difference between Ronnie’s and Bradley’s reasons. Schroeder argues that if the Standard-Constitutive
Conjecture is true, the only other option is a Constitutive Model explanation. We
could say that Ronnie’s desiring to dance is part of what it is for him to have a
reason to go to the party. A Humean conclusion immediately follows: desires are
necessary for the existence of reasons ð79Þ.
One could challenge these arguments by trying to provide what Schroeder
thinks the Standard Model theorist can’t provide: a specification of the reason to
do what we enjoy. One might argue that doing what one enjoys contributes to
making one’s life go well, and that’s the reason to do what we enjoy—dancing in
Ronnie’s case but not in Bradley’s. ðSchroeder acknowledges a view along these
lines and notes that it generates problems when conjoined with a buck-passing
view of value ½58 n. 18. But, if you’re not already inclined toward buck-passing, it
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seems to be a live option.Þ Or perhaps the answer is even simpler: the reason for
us to do what we would enjoy, as opposed to doing something else, is simply that
we’d enjoy it.
Also, one could argue that in cases where Schroeder thinks Standard Model
explanations succeed in explaining why different agents have different reasons,
it’s also difficult to specify what the reason is to perform the more general action. Consider Schroeder’s example of a successful Standard Model explanation
involving promising ð69–73Þ. Al promises to meet Rose, and Andy promises to
meet his mother, and so Al has a reason to meet Rose, and Andy a reason to meet
his mother, and these different reasons “can be traced back to a reason they have
in common—to keep their promises” ð72Þ. But one might argue that just as in
Ronnie’s and Bradley’s case, it’s not obvious what the reason is to keep our promises. ðSchroeder does attempt to specify such reasons: “One such reason is that
breaking promises tends to destroy their usefulness. Another is that breaking
promises is a breach of trust” ½72. But the former applies only to some promises—
not to those where your breaking them won’t be discovered and hence won’t
tend to undermine the usefulness of the institution. And the latter explains too
much, since you do not have a reason to avoid all breaches of trust, as when the
trust someone places in you is entirely ungrounded and irrational.Þ Just as it isn’t
obvious what the reason is for us to do what we enjoy, it isn’t obvious what the reason is for us to keep our promises.
Part 2 turns toward issues concerning reduction and supervenience. Rejection
of the Standard Model Theory makes room for Constitutive Model explanations,
including those central to Schroeder’s reductive realism: explanations where
normative properties reduce to nonnormative properties. One central advantage
of such views is that they explain the supervenience of the moral on the nonmoral:
if moral properties reduce to nonmoral ones, then there can be no change in the
moral properties without a change in the nonmoral properties. But it’s harder to
see how the nonreductivist could explain supervenience. The essays in part 2
consider the prospects for nonreductivism on this front, after first clarifying the
aspirations and commitments of reductive views.
In “What Matters about Metaethics?” Schroeder addresses Derek Parfit’s
claim that all versions of reductive realism are incompatible with things mattering. Schroeder argues, convincingly, that unlike an error theory, nothing
about reductive realism need threaten the claim that some things matter. Rather,
plausible versions of reductive realism will “hold fixed ordinary normative ideas
and try to answer some further explanatory questions in a way that is theoretically
satisfying” ð87Þ.
The next two papers consider the prospects for nonreductivist approaches
to supervenience. The more technical, but accessible, “Supervenience under
Relaxed Assumptions” ðcoauthored with Johannes SchmittÞ considers Ralph
Wedgwood’s response to supervenience arguments against nonreductive realism. Wedgewood’s strategy is to reject the S5 axiom of modal logic, ◊A → □ ◊A,
on which many of these arguments rely. Schmitt and Schroeder argue that Wedgewood’s strategy commits him to denying intuitively compelling supervenience
theses.
In Schroeder’s previously unpublished “The Price of Supervenience,” we see
another surprising way in which normative explanations are relevant to debates
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in metaethics. Schroeder offers an insightful proposal for how the Standard Model
Theory ðwhich he doesn’t endorseÞ could be used to defend nonreductive moral
realism ðalso not endorsedÞ from the accusation of being unable to explain supervenience.
Here’s an overview of the proposal, divided into three steps. First, Schroeder
distinguishes between “pure” and “bastard” moral claims. Pure moral claims are
necessary. But bastard moral claims, which “relate the non-moral to a special
class of ‘pure’ moral claims,” are contingent ð131Þ. The distinction is based on an
analogous one for mathematics between pure mathematical claims ðe.g., 28 > 10Þ,
which are necessary, and bastard mathematical claims, which relate the “pure”
mathematical claims to the nonmathematical and are contingent ðe.g., I have
more teeth than toesÞ. Second, we appeal to the Standard Model Theory to specify which moral claims are pure and which are bastards: our most general obligations are pure, while the less general ones are bastards, since they relate the pure
to the nonmoral. For instance, the claim that one ought to keep promises is a
pure moral claim, but that Mark ought to attend the workshop is a bastard moral
claim, since it relates this pure moral claim to a nonmoral claim, namely, that
Mark promised to attend the workshop. Third, we use this to explain supervenience
as follows: since the pure moral claims are necessary, they cannot change. So, it
trivially follows that they cannot change without a nonmoral change. And since
the bastard claims relate the pure claims to nonmoral claims, and since the “pure”
component cannot change, the bastard claims are such that they can change only
if there’s a nonmoral change. Schroeder thus shows how the nonreductivist has
resources to explain supervenience ðalthough, he notes, the appeal to unexplained
necessities in pure moral claims raises further worriesÞ.
The essays in parts 3 and 4 are concerned primarily with instrumental
rationality—that is, the rational prohibition on intending some end while not
also intending a means believed to be necessary for achieving that end. This
requirement can be formulated in at least two ways. On a “narrow-scope” interpretation, “requires” has scope over the consequent of a conditional: if you
intend an end and believe some means is necessary to it, rationality requires you
to intend the means. ðThis interpretation runs into difficulty when it’s intuitively
rationally permissible for you to abandon an end, or revise your belief, instead of
intending the means.Þ On a “wide-scope” interpretation, in contrast, “requires” has
scope over a conditional: rationality requires that if you intend an end and believe
some means is necessary to it, you intend the means. Here, you could do what
rationality requires by abandoning the end, ceasing to believe the means is necessary, or intending the means.
Schroeder’s first published paper, “The Scope of Instrumental Reason,”
played an important role in initiating the debate between “wide-scopers” and
“narrow-scopers” that still flourishes in journals over a decade later. The most
important contribution of that paper, in my view, is the “symmetry” objection against the wide-scope interpretations of rational requirements. Consider
the wide-scoped instrumental requirement above. Schroeder observes that it’s
unintuitive to think that ceasing to believe some means is necessary would be
rationally permitted by a requirement of instrumental rationality ð156–57Þ. At
the very least, it’s a way of escaping, rather than satisfying, the requirement ð163Þ.
But, on the wide-scope view, one could make the relevant conditional true by
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either ceasing to hold this belief or intending the means, and so both are equally
good ways of doing what is required ðso far as this requirement goesÞ. Thus, an
objectionable “symmetry” is posited by the wide-scoper. ðAs Schroeder anticipates, wide-scopers might attempt to account for “asymmetry” intuitions by appealing to other requirements, perhaps requirements of theoretical rationality,
one might violate by revising one’s belief ½157.Þ
In “Means-Ends Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons” Schroeder
develops a novel account of instrumental rationality in terms of subjective reasons, although one that requires we have the view ðor something close to itÞ that
intending to f involves believing that one ought to f. In his introduction to
the volume, Schroeder distances himself from the main positive proposal of this
paper ð11Þ. Nonetheless, the broad strategy of appealing to subjective reasons to
account for instrumental rationality remains an interesting and promising option.
In “The Hypothetical Imperative?” Schroeder presents the case for reading
Kant as a narrow-scoper. He argues that it’s difficult to square the wide-scope
interpretation of Kantian hypothetical imperatives with, among other things,
what Kant says about how hypothetical imperatives are to be distinguished from
categorical ones and how hypothetical imperatives are to be analytically derived
from the concept of willing an end. But Schroeder recognizes that the narrowscope interpretation would put Kant in a difficult spot, given the possibility of immoral aims. If someone were to intend an immoral end, a narrow-scope interpretation of hypothetical imperatives would require that he intend immoral means
and so would require something inconsistent with what is required by Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Schroeder’s way out is to read Kant as denying the possibility
of willing ðin Kant’s sense of willeÞ immoral ends ð212–13Þ.
This is an interesting proposal, but it makes puzzling the passage where
Kant says that hypothetical imperatives apply both to reasonable, good ends and
to unreasonable, bad ends—both to the physician aiming to make his patient
healthy and the poisoner aiming to bring certain death to his victim ðAkademie 4:
415Þ. There’s no indication in that passage that Kant thinks the physician’s aim
is possible but the poisoner’s is impossible. He tells us that “the hypothetical
imperative thus says only that the action is good for some possible or actual aim”
and uses these examples to illustrate possible aims to which these “imperatives of
skill” would apply ðImmanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ed.
and trans. Allen W. Wood ½New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002, 31–32Þ.
If there’s another sense in which such aims are impossible—namely, that they
can’t be “willed” in conformity with the moral law—it doesn’t seem to be one that
Kant has in mind in this passage.
Kantian themes are further explored in “Hypothetical Imperatives, Scope
and Jurisdiction,” which develops an illuminating analogy between legal jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of rational requirements. Schroeder here objects
that wide-scopers posit an unexplained requirement with “universal jurisdiction over all rational agents” ð222; see also 157–58Þ. Narrow-scopers, in contrast,
posit a requirement that is applicable only in certain conditions, namely, when
one intends an end and believes the means to be necessary. This conditionality
“makes hypothetical imperatives easier to explain” ð225Þ.
However, it’s not clear how narrow-scoping, by itself, generates significant
explanatory advantages. After all, the mere citation of a sufficient condition for
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something need not explain it particularly well. Moreover, even if it did, it’s not
clear why we couldn’t modify the wide-scope view to include the relevant conditionality. Perhaps: if you intend some end, believe a means is necessary to that
end, and don’t intend the means, then you’re required to abandon the end,
abandon your belief, or intend the means. The antecedent provides the ðpossibly
explanatoryÞ jurisdictional restriction, while the consequent gives the wide-scoper
what he really wants: a disjunctive requirement.
The final paper, “Scope for Rational Autonomy,” however, tells us more
about how the narrow-scoper could explain requirements of rationality by
appealing to the conditions which make them applicable. The basic idea is that
you are subject to these requirements because you impose them on yourself.
Specifically, by adopting some attitude, such as a belief or intention, you commit
yourself to having, or not having, some other attitude. So, rather than explaining
what rationality requires of you by appeal to wide-scope requirements with jurisdiction over all agents—the kind of explanation Standard Model Theorists,
like Cudworth, might go in for—we can instead adopt the attractive Kantian idea
that rational requirements are self-legislated through the adoption of attitudes.
Again, an interesting theoretical option is made available by moving away from
the Standard Model Theory.
John Brunero
University of Nebraska–Lincoln

Slote, Michael. From Enlightenment to Receptivity: Rethinking Our Values.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 272. $49.95 ðclothÞ.
In From Enlightenment to Receptivity, Michael Slote provides a defense of the value
of receptivity and a critique of rationalism. The book starts with a quote from
Prichard lamenting the remoteness of many discussions of moral philosophy
from “the facts of actual life” ðviÞ. Slote takes this idea seriously: the book is
accessible to a general audience, while at the same time providing philosophical
arguments of interest to specialists. Throughout the book, Slote emphasizes the
narrowness of the rationalist picture and how receptivity allows for a richer picture of values, one that includes aspects that he laments have been marginalized
in the Western philosophical tradition.
Slote declares as his targets the emphasis on action, control, and rationality
that are, as he notes, also the focus of environmentalist and feminist critiques of
rationalism. He criticizes postmodern theories sometimes used to support these
movements for their relativist implications ð27Þ. Instead, he conceives of his project as the use of analytic methods to “show something quite radical” ð29Þ, an attempt to provide a critique of Enlightenment thought that is “philosophically
clearer and more forceful than anything we have been told by the postmodernists”
ð31Þ. Slote argues that proper caring for another requires receptivity, and on this
basis he presents his view as providing a theoretical basis for an ethics of care
along the lines of Gilligan’s. The virtue of receptivity is opposed to what Slote
calls the “Faustian emphasis on activity/dominance/control/autonomy” that he
believes has permeated enlightenment rationalism ð4Þ. This emphasis, he argues,

